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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article summarizes the recent developments of the law in the
area of business torts from October 1, 1993 to September 30, 1994
(the Survey period). Specifically, this Article covers the topics of
tortious interference with contractual and business relationships, anti-
trust, covenants not to compete, and trade secrets analyzing these well-
established legal theories and the important cases decided during the Sur-
vey period that related to these areas. Because this is the first year that
the Texas Survey has included the coverage of these areas in this format,
the Article will provide a discussion of the basic legal principles applica-
ble to each area covered.
* B.S., University of Notre Dame; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Law Clerk
to the Honorable A. Joe Fish, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas.
** B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate, Lynn,
Stodghill and Melsheimer, L.L.P.
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II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND
BUSINESS RELATIONS
A. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
1. Background
The tort of tortious interference with contract protects the relationship
between parties to a contract from external actions which may diminish
the value of the contract or make the contract more or less difficult to
perform.' One Texas court has opined that "[t]he law governing the area
of tortious interference with contract is not a well developed area."' 2 Re-
cent Texas Supreme Court opinions, 3 however, have bestowed greater
emphasis on the formulation of these torts as outlined in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.4 For the Texas practitioner, this apparent shift by the
Texas Supreme Court should provide further guidance on this ever
changing area of the law. The elements of a cause of action for tortious
interference with a contract include the following:5 (1) the existence of a
contract,6 (2) a willful and intentional act of interference, (3) proximate
causation, and (4) actual damage or loss to the plaintiff.7
Several important issues permeate the inquiry into the existence of a
contract. Although Texas law does not require that the contract inter-
fered with actually be enforceable,8 contracts which are void or voidable
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at
978 (1984 & Supp. 1988)[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2. American Petrofina, Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 679 S.W.2d 740, 759 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd by agr.).
3. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Texas, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.
1992); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assoc., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 (Tex. 1990);
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)]. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) defines the tort as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other
from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
Id. § 766.
5. For a discussion of the affirmative defense of justification, see infra § B.2.
6. The question of whether a contract exists is generally a question of law. Lone Star
Steel Co. v. Scott, 759 S.W.2d 144, 157 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied). How-
ever, the jury resolves factual disputes which question whether the parties intended to be
bound to the agreement and resolves the question of whether the parties agreed to dis-
puted terms. Id.
7. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1993); Victoria Bank
& 'ftust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v.
Welch Assoc., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tex. 1990); Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W.2d 848,
853 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied); Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1986).
8. See Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. 1969)("the unenforceability of
a contract is no defense to an action for tortious interference with its performance"); Ex-
xon Corp. v. AlIsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ de-




will not support a cause of action for tortious interference.9 For example,
in Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.,1 the Texas Supreme Court held that a
terminable-at-will employment contract can provide the basis for a tor-
tious interference claim." The law is unresolved, however, as to whether
competition will provide a defense to a claim based on an at-will
contract. 12
Courts applying Texas law analyze the intent element by applying the
definition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 8A. The focal in-
quiry shifts to whether the interferer acted with malice.' 3 The Texas
Supreme Court addressed the intent issue in Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. v. John Carlo Texas, Inc.'4 Quoting the Restatement (Second), the
supreme court concluded that intent to interfere requires that the defend-
ant foresaw the consequences of his actions or was substantially certain of
the likely result of his acts.' 5
A successful plaintiff claiming tortious interference with contract must
prove the defendant actually interfered with an existing contract.' 6 Nu-
merous types of acts by the defendant can satisfy this element of the tort.
In American National Petroleum Co.vs. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp.'7 the Texas Supreme Court held that intentionally breaching one's
own contract can provide a basis for a tortious interference claim if the
breaching party intends to prevent a third party from performing its own
contract. 18 Another intentional act which might satisfy this element is the
prosecution of a lawsuit in bad faith for the purpose of causing damage.' 9
It is important to note that tort liability can attach even though the
interference does not cause an actual breach of the contract.20 For exam-
ple, a defendant's actions which delay performance of the contract or in-
crease the burden of performing the contract satisfy this element.
2
'
9. Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 664-65.
10. 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989).
11. Id at 689.
12. See Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir.
1985).
13. See Anthony Pools, Inc. v. Charles & David, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 666, 668 n.2 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)("The defendant must be shown to have
maliciously interfered . . .with 'malice' being defined as an act without excuse of just
cause").
14. 843 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1992).
15. Id. at 472.
16. Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 664.
17. 798 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1990).
18. Id at 279. See generally Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538
S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. 1976); Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 452, 73 S.W. 800, 804
(1903).
19. Hughes v. Houston N.W. Medical Ctr., 680 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Hughes is contrary to the general rule that pursuing a
lawsuit is a privileged act and therefore not actionable. See Ryan v. Laurel, 809 S.W.2d
258, 261 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
20. Hughes, 680 S.W.2d at 842.
21. See Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 573 (Tex. App.-




Ultimately, the interferer must affect the plaintiff's rights under the
contract.22
2. Recent Developments
Texas courts addressed several issues in the area of tortious interfer-
ence with contract during the Survey period. Although none of the cases
drastically change this area of the law, the courts continue to refine ex-
isting legal principles.
a. Intent
The only Texas Supreme Court case during the Survey period which
addressed the intent element23 of tortious interference was Browning-
Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna,24 which involved a case between two business com-
petitors in the business of providing street cleaning services. Reyna un-
derbid Browning-Ferris on a contract by the City of Dallas to provide
street cleaning services. After the city abruptly terminated the contract,
Reyna filed suit alleging that Browning-Ferris tortiously interfered with
the street cleanihg contract. At the conclusion of Reyna's case, the jury
returned a verdict against Browning-Ferris and awarded damages. The
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
Reyna relied on a conversation he had with a highway department in-
spector as the basis of this tortious interference claim.25 The supreme
court held, however, that this statement did not satisfy the requisite inten-
tional interference element of a tortious interference claim.26 Although
the statement demonstrates that Browning-Ferris may have been in-
volved in a plan to terminate Reyna's contract, the inspector's statement,
without more, did not establish knowing inducement.27 In order for a
litigant to satisfy the intent element of tortious interference, the plaintiff
must establish a nexus between the conduct or statements that provide
the basis for the tort and the parties charged with interfering.28
22. See Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. 1976).
23. Closs v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1994, no writ) reiterated the principle that tortious interference with contract is
an intentional tort under Texas law. See also Frost Nat'l Bank v. Alamo Nat'l Bank, 421
S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1993).
25. In the conversation, the inspector stated he "and his supervisor were 'working with
[Browning-Ferris] to get [Reyna] out of the contract.' " 865 S.W.2d at 926.
26. Id. at 927.
27. Id.; see also Robey v. Sun Record Co., 242 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 816 (1957); J.S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stoneworks, 96 Tex. 453, 73 S.W.
800 (1903).
28. The supreme court's analysis in Browning-Ferris is consistent with an earlier case
construing the intent element which required knowing and intentional interference. See
Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969)(plaintiff must establish knowing and
intentional interference).
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b. Existence of a Contract
During the Survey period, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether a contract existed in S&A Marinas, Inc. v. Leonard
Marine Corp,.29 The plaintiff, S&A Marinas (S&A), and the defendant,
Leonard Marine (Leonard), owned competing marina operations and
each attempted to secure a new lease on additional marina space from
the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA). The LCRA passed a res-
olution awarding the contract to S&A, but eventually awarded the lease
to Leonard. Subsequently, S&A filed suit against Leonard alleging, inter
alia, tortious interference with contract.30
The dispositive issue before the court centered on whether a board res-
olution authorizing the LCRA to negotiate with S&A as the future lessee
constituted a contract which could then be subject to interference by Leo-
nard. The interpretation of the contract presented a legal question,
rather than a question of fact for the jury, because the contract was un-
ambiguous.31 The court held that no contract existed between the LCRA
and S&A because the language of the board resolution did not evidence
an intent to be bound. 32
c. Actual Interference
In West v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation District3 3 the plaintiff, West,
filed suit against his employer, the Brazos River Navigation District (the
Navigation District) and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
(Merrill Lynch) charging tortious interference with an employment con-
tract. The Navigation District released Clay from his position as director
of finance and administration allegedly in retaliation for West's cancella-
tion of an investment agreement with Merrill Lynch. West claimed that
Merrill Lynch tortiously interfered with his employment contract and
caused his termination.
In ruling on Merrill Lynch's motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that West failed to prove that Merrill Lynch actually interfered
with the contract. 34 West argued that Merrill Lynch had the motive to
interfere but had no evidence of actual interference. The lack of actual
evidence of interference proved fatal to West's claim. Accordingly, evi-
dence of improper purpose without proof of an act of interference will
not support a contention of tortious interference with contract.
29. 875 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
30. S&A Marine did not plead a cause of action for tortious interference with business
relations. Id. at 767.
31. Id. at 769. (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. 1981)).
32. Id.
33. 836 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
34. Id. at 1339-40.
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B. ToRTIous INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS
1. Background
The tort of tortious interference with prospective business relations is
closely akin to the claim for tortious interference with contract. In fact,
courts and commentators sometimes blur the distinctions between the
torts. Two distinct causes of action exist, however, under Texas law. Tor-
tious interference with business relations actually includes two independ-
ent causes of action: interference with prospective contracts and
interference with prospective business relations.
The Restatement (Second) recognizes tortious interference with pro-
spective contracts, 35 and at least one Texas court has adopted that defini-
tion.36 Although the Restatement (Second) does not define a separate
cause of action for interference with business relations, the Restatement
drafters intended section 766B to apply to this type of claim.37 Further-
more, section 767 lists several factors applicable to the inquiry into
whether the interferer acted improperly.38
Courts have articulated four elements in a claim for tortious interfer-
ence with a prospective contract: (1) a showing of reasonable probability
that the plaintiff would enter into the contractual relationship; (2) a mali-
cious and intentional act by the defendant which prevented the relation-
ship from occurring;39 (3) lack of privilege or justification by the
35. Section 766B of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) reads as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective
contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the rela-
tion, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or con-
tinue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective
relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 766B.
36. Tarleton State Univ. v. Rosiere, 867 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993,
no writ).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 766B cmt. c.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 767. The factors to consider include the
following:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and
the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference
and(g) the relation between the parties.
Id.
39. Because the level of intent associated with interference with prospective relations
is malice, a higher showing is required than for interference with an existing contract.
Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir. 1985)(apply-
ing Texas law); Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1985) (evi-
dence of discord between parties held insufficient to satisfy the malice requirement);




defendant; and (4) actual harm or damage to the plaintiff.40 The follow-
ing four elements constitute a cause of action for tortious interference
with a business relationship: (1) a wrongful act by the defendant; (2)
without legal right or justification; (3) with intent to harm the plaintiff; (4)
which results in actual damage.4 1 The most important distinction be-
tween this cause of action and one for tortious interference with an ex-
isting contract is that the plaintiff claiming interference with a business
relationship must prove lack of justification as part of the prima facie
case.42 In the context of tortious interference with contract, however, jus-
tification is an affirmative defense.43 The next section discusses the con-
cept of justification as it applies to both tortious interference with
contract and business relationships.
2. Recent Developments: Justification
In Tarleton State University v. Rosiere,44 Rosiere, a professor at Tarle-
ton State University (the University), was denied tenure and brought suit
against the University, its president and the vice-president for student
services. Rosiere claimed that the officials wrongly denied him tenure
after he criticized certain policies advocated by the president of the Uni-
versity. The court first ruled that Rosiere demonstrated a reasonable
probability of forming a future business relationship with the university.45
Rosiere's claim against the president ultimately failed, 46 however, be-
cause the court found that the president was an agent of the university
and therefore could not interfere with Rosiere's prospective relation.47
40. Tarleton State Univ. v. Rosiere, 867 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993,
writ dism'd by agr.); C.E. Serv., Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985); Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516
F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1975).
41. American Medical Int'l v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1985, no writ); CF&I Steel Corp. v. Pete Sublett & Co., 623 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. See Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 440-41 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied). The broadest form of justification which bars recov-
ery for the plaintiff is fair competition. See, e.g., Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L.
Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1975)(applying the competition justification
only if defendant's actions are classified as fair play); Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 272
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)(justification privilege applies only to ac-
tions reasonably calculated to achieve legitimate business goals).
43. Sterner v. Marathon Oil, Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989). As in all affirma-
tive defenses under Texas law, the defendant carries the burden of proof. Id. Moreover, as
required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant must plead justification
affirmatively in a responsive pleading. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
44. 867 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, no writ).
45. Id. at 952.
46. The trial entered a judgment for Rosiere after the jury awarded him $155,665 in
damages for economic loss, pain and suffering, humiliation, damage to reputation, and
exemplary damages. Id. at 949-50.
47. Id. at 953. The court, citing American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d
331, 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)(only third parties are liable for
tortious interference), found that because the president was an agent of the university and
therefore not a third party, he was not liable for tortious interference. Id.
19951
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Moreover, the court ruled that the vice-president's communication
with the president about statements that Rosiere voiced at an official uni-
versity function were justified as a matter of law.48 Although the vice-
president played no official role in the tenure decisions, the court decided
that he had an interest in protecting the image of the university.49 Be-
cause the events in question took place at an official university recruiting
function, the vice-president had an even greater interest in promoting the
public relations of the school. Finally, the court added that Rosiere failed
to prove that the vice-president acted with malice.5 0
Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hospital5 also focused on the issue
of justification. After the hospital denied Gonzalez staff privileges, he
filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the hospital tortiously interfered with his
business relations and an existing contract. 52 The court of appeals af-
firmed the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of the
hospital.53
The hospital argued on appeal that it had carried the burden of proof
required to establish an affirmative defense to the claim of tortious inter-
ference with contract.54 Prior to the denial of staff privileges, the hospital
entered into an exclusive contract with a group of doctors to provide an-
esthesiology to the hospital. After executing the contract and going
through a period of disagreement with Gonzalez, Carillo stopped sched-
uling Gonzalez for surgical procedures, effectively revoking Gonzalez's
hospital staff procedures.
The court concluded that the hospital had the legal right to enter into
an exclusive arrangement with Dr. Cavillo.5 5 As a result, the court rea-
soned that the hospital's decision to effectively deny Gonzalez staff privi-
leges via Dr. Cavillo's prerogatives or sole scheduler represented a bona
fide use of its legal rights.56 Accordingly, the court held that the hospital
48. Id. at 953. Rosiere stated his opposition to the president's proposed sale of a ranch
owned by the university.
49. Id. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, §§ 770, 772 for the
proportion that an employee who notifies his superiors about improper conduct of a co-
employee does not commit improper purpose. Rosiere, 867 S.W.2d at 953.
50. Id. at 953 n.7.
51. 880 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied).
52. Gonzalez alleged both tortious interference with an existing contract and tortious
interference with business relations.
53. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 443.
54. To prevail on an affirmative defense of justification, a defendant must establish
either a good faith exercise of legal rights or an equal or superior interest in the subject
matter. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991); Sterner, 797
S.W.2d at 691. Courts analyze the justification defense no differently in the context of
tortious interference with an existing contract than in the framework of tortious interfer-
ence with business relations. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 441.
55. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 441. The court cited Williams v. Hobbs, 460 N.E.2d 287(Ohio Ct. App. 1983) for the proposition that exclusive contracts represents a reasonable
exercise of the hospital's duty to manage the affairs of the institution. Id.
56. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 441.
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sustained its burden to affirmatively prove that it's actions were
justified.57
III. TEXAS FREE ENTERPRISE AND ANTITRUSTACT OF 198358
The Texas Legislature completely reworked the state antitrust law with
the adoption of this new statutory scheme. The stated purpose of the
Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 (the Act) "is to maintain
and promote economic competition in trade and commerce occurring...
within the State of Texas and to provide the benefits of that competition
to consumers in the state."'59 To aid the implementation of the Act, the
statutory language directs the courts to adopt consistent federal prece-
dent where applicable. 6°
During the Survey period, three Texas courts of appeals addressed is-
sues arising under the Act. Though few in number, these judicial deci-
sions are nonetheless significant.
The court in Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hospital6' addressed
the issue of whether an alleged conspiracy which existed between a doc-
tor and the San Jacinto Methodist Hospital (San Jacinto) constituted an
unlawful restraint of trade. San Jacinto entered into an exclusive agree-
ment with Dr. Octovio Cavillo (Cavillo) for anesthesiology services at the
hospital. As a result of this contract, Gonzalez lost his staff privileges as
an anesthesiologist. Gonzalez filed suit against the hospital alleging that
a conspiracy existed between San Jacinto and Cavillo which rose to the
level of an illegal restraint of trade.62
Gonzalez's claim failed because the court could find no evidence of a
conspiracy or unlawful act which would provide the predicate for a viola-
tion of section 15.05(a). 63 The court recognized that San Jacinto had the
legal right under its bylaws to enter into an exclusive contract as an exer-
57. Although the summary judgment evidence tended to show that Dr. Cavillo may
have acted in bad faith, the court refused to attribute his actions to the hospital. Id. This
distinction is crucial in the context of a multi-defendant case.
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-15.26 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
59. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
60. Id. Section 15.05 which lists the unlawful practices of the Act is modeled after
portions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988) and the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1988). See Jerry R. Selinger, Sherman Marches on Austin: Some Com-
ments About the New Texas Antitrust Act, 47 TEx. B.J. 56, 56 (1984).
An in-depth analysis of the Act is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough
discussion of the Act see David J. Van Susteren, Comment, The Texas Free Enterprise Act
and Antitrust Act - Analysis and Implications, 22 Hous. L. REv. 1181 (1985); Lyman G.
Hughes, Torts-Commercial' Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 35 (1984).
61. 880 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied). Other issues in Gonza-
lez relating to tortious interference with contract are discussed supra notes 44-59 and ac-
companying text.
62. Gonzalez alleged that San Jacinto violated Tx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.05(a) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995) which reads: "Every contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful."
63. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 444-43.
1995]
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cise of its responsibility to manage the business affairs of the hospital.64
To make out a claim of restraint of trade, "the restrainer must have the
power to cause adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant prod-
uct and geographic markets. ' 65 The court relied on United States
Supreme Court authority:to reinforce its holding that the exclusive agree-
ment did not create an anti-competitive effect on the market. 66 Even
though Gonzalez tried to rely on a conspiracy theory as the basis of the
violation, the court still required him to show anticompetitive effect in the
marketplace. 67
Gonzalez argued, showing support only by affidavit, that the exclusive
agreement between San Jacinto and Cavillo, and others like it at other
hospitals in the region, had prevented him from obtaining work at these
hospitals. As a result, he opined, an illegal restraint of trade existed. The
court held, however, that he failed to provide the required nexus with
anticompetitive impact on competition in the marketplace. 68 The court
remarked that:
[a]t most, it may imply that this form of agreement has become so
prevalent as to prevent an individual doctor specializing in this area
from obtaining work at any hospital in the area unless he goes to
work for one of the provider groups. However, it does not necessar-
ily provide proof of an actual adverse effect on competition. 69
Gonzalez's failure to adduce sufficient evidence of a restraint of trade
with anticompetitive effects on the marketplace resulted in the court of
appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment.70
The court in Phoenix Bit & Tool, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.71 addressed the
issue of whether an exclusive right to purchase used drill bits renders a
contract unenforceable under the Act. Phoenix Bit & Tool, Inc. (Phoe-
nix) entered into an agreement with Texaco, Inc. (Texaco) which pro-
vided Phoenix the exclusive right to purchase used drill bits.72 After
Texaco terminated the contract according to its provisions, Phoenix filed
suit alleging that it had the exclusive right to purchase all used drill bits
that Texaco disposed of in the course of its business and that Texaco
breached the contract. The trial court granted Texaco's motion for sum-
64. Id at 439-41.
65. Id. at 441.
66. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). In that case the
Supreme Court held that an anti-competitive effect would result only if hospital patients
were required to purchase the contracting firm's services as a result of the hospital's supe-
rior market position. Id. at 25.
67. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 441 ("[W]ithout a showing of actual adverse effect on
competition, respondent cannot make out a case under the antitrust laws, and no such
showing has been made." (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31)).
68. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 442.
69. Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 442-43.
70. Id. at 443.
71. 879 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
72. The pertinent contract clause covered the following material: "Such quantities of
used drill bits in various sizes that [Texaco] may want to dispose of from the Denver, Los
Angeles, Midland, and New Orleans operations of [Texaco]." Id. at 279.
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mary-judgment holding, inter alia, that the exclusive right to contract ren-
dered the contract illegal under section 15.05(c) of the Act.73
The Houston Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial on the antitrust
issue on two grounds.74 The court's primary holding was that the section
15.05(c) of the Act did not apply to the facts of this case.75 "[T]his statute
does not make unlawful any required exclusivity of a seller's committ-
ment [sic] to deal only with the purchaser, and not the purchaser's com-
petitors. '76 The focus is therefore on the impact of the exclusive
agreement on competitors in the marketplace and not on the influence of
the arrangement on the parties to the contract. Accordingly, the court
found no illegality under the Act.77
The Houston court further examined the issue in dicta. After review-
ing in detail the terms of the contract, the court concluded that it was
neither an output contract nor an ordinary supply contract. 78 The court
found no intent to restrain trade or create a monopoly and as a result
there was no violation of the Act. Accordingly, the court concluded that
"this ground cannot support the summary judgment. 79
In dissent, Justice Lee disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
contract does not confer on Phoenix the exclusive right to purchase all of
Texaco's used drill bits.80 Justice Lee argued that Texaco failed to carry
its summary judgment burden to prove that the contract did not give
Phoenix an exclusive right to purchase the used bits and that this reading
of the contract rendered it illegal under the Act.
Section 15.05(c) renders a contract illegal only if prevents a buyer from
"dealing in the goods of competitors of the seller."''s Justice Lee opined
that Texaco failed to establish the applicability of section 15.05(c) to the
contract at issue because the contract did not contain a clause limiting
73. Id at 279-80. Section 15.05(c) of the Act provides that:
It is unlawful for any person to sell, lease, or contract for the sale or lease of
any goods, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale
or to fix a price for such use, consumption, or resale or to discount from or
rebate upon such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that
the purchaser or lessee shall not use or deal in the goods of a competitor or
competitors of the seller or lessor, where the effect of the condition, agree-
ment, or understanding may be to lessen competition substantially in any line
of trade or commerce.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(c) (Vernon 1987).
74. Curiously, the court addresses the antitrust issue even though Texaco did not raise
the issue on appeal as a basis for affirming the trial court's judgment in its favor. Phoenix,
89 S.W. 201 at 280.
75. Id. at 280.
76. Id
77. Id The court affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that "there was no
intent to require Texaco to sell all used drill bits to Phoenix." Id at 280. Because Texaco
complied with the express terms for terminating the contract, Phoenix had no meritorious
claim against Texaco. Id.
78. Id at 281.
79. Id
80. Id (Lee, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 283.
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Phoenix's rights to deal with Texaco's competitors.82 Because Texaco
failed to carry its summary judgment burden, Justice Lee would have re-
versed the judgment and remanded the matter to the lower court for
trial.83
In Segura v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.84 the plaintiffs Crystal Segura
and others (Segura) intervened in a class action suit on behalf of them-
selves and others similarly situated against the manufacturers of infant
baby formula (Abbott). The State of Texas originally brought the suit
alleging antitrust violations against the Abbott defendants.85 Segura as-
serted claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act 86 (DTPA) and alleged unconscionable conduct by Abbott.
The trial court dismissed the State's antitrust claims and held that the
indirect purchaser doctrine deprived the State of standing to assert a
cause of action against Abbott.87 The trial court subsequently granted
Abbott's motion for summary judgment concluding that Segura's uncon-
scionability claim failed under the DTPA and alternatively that the indi-
rect-purchaser doctrine of antitrust jurisprudence deprived Segura of
standing under the DTPA.88 The Austin Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's order and remanded the case for further disposition. 89
The issue on appeal was whether lack of standing under the Act, be-
cause of the indirect-purchaser doctrine, will preclude recovery under the
DTPA. Abbott argued that an impermissible statutory conflict would re-
sult if the court allowed recovery under the DTPA while prohibiting re-
covery under the Act. Consistency under the Act and the DTPA, Abbott
argued, is accomplished by giving full effect to the Act and depriving
Segura a right of action under the DTPA.
The court concluded that the indirect-purchaser rule did not apply to
the DTPA and therefore did not interfere with Segura's standing under
the DTPA.90 The Austin Court of Appeals, however, refused to directly
82. Id.; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(c).
83. Phoenix, 879 S.W.2d at 283.
84. 873 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ granted).
85. The State sought relief on behalf of all Texas consumers seeking injunctive relief
and compensatory damages resulting from Abbot overcharging consumers of baby
formula. Id. at 401; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21 (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1995)(authorizing government agencies to file suit to recover damages and obtain injunc-
tive relief).
86. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
87. Segura, 873 S.W.2d at 401. The indirect purchaser doctrine was first formulated by
the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). This doctrine pre-
vents an indirect purchaser from suing a manufacturer or wholesaler for violations of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988). Id. at 736-37. A purchaser is deemed a direct pur-
chaser if "purchases goods or services directly from a manufacturer, wholesaler, or other
provider" who violated the Clayton Act. Segura, 873 S.W.2d at 403. On the other hand, an
indirect purchaser purchases goods or services from a seller "who is down the marketing
chain from the antitrust violator." Id. The public policy behind this doctrine is to reduce
the complexity of these types of antitrust actions and avoid the difficulty of apportioning
damages to indirect purchasers. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737-38.
88. Id at 402.
89. Id at 408.
90. Segura, 873 S.W.2d at 406.
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confront the issue of whether the indirect-purchaser doctrine even applies
to the Texas Antitrust Act.91 Instead, the court concluded that even if the
doctrine were applicable, "there is no conflict between the Act and the
DTPA." 92 "Based on the absence of an express exemption in either the
DTPA or the [Act], combined with the presumption against finding stat-
utes to be in conflict by implication, we decline to hold that the indirect-
purchaser rule applies to the DTPA. ' 93
IV. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
In 1987, the Texas Supreme Court changed its approach to enforcing
covenants not to compete. 94 In Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.95 the
supreme court refused to enforce a covenant not to compete agree-
ment.96 Attempting to justify its decision under prior case law, the court
actually made new precedent by holding that "covenants not to compete
which are primarily designed to limit competition or restrain the right to
engage in a common calling are not enforceable." 97 The court, however,
failed to define the term "common calling." 98 Without any guidance as to
the term's meaning, Texas courts applied this new common calling stan-
dard to determine the enforceability of contested covenants not to com-
pete with varying results.99
91. Id. at 403 n.2.
92. Id. at 403. The court reasoned "that when the legislature wishes to exempt certain
defendants or claims from the coverage of the DTPA, it does so in unequivocal terms." Id.
at 404.
93. Id. at 406.
94. The concern regarding restraint of trade dates back to the creation of the Texas
Constitution, which prohibits the State or any political subdivision from creating a monop-
oly. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26. Regardless of the effect on trade, Texas courts have regularly
enforced covenants not to compete so long as they were reasonable. Weatherford Oil Tool
Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1960).
95. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
96. Id. at 172.
97. William John Bux, Enforcement of Noncompetition Covenants, in MODERN
TRENDS IN BUSINESS LITGATION SEMINAR, Tab 0, p. 6 (Southern Methodist Univ. School
of Law, Oct. 24-25, 1991)(citing Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 172.) (emphasis added).
98. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 177 (Gonzales, J. dissenting). The Dallas Court of Appeals was
the first court to define the term common calling. In Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours,
Inc., the court used the definitions of each individual word to create the following defini-
tion of common calling: a vocation or profession of the usual type which is entirely ordi-
nary and undistinguished. 742 S.W.2d 837, 840-41 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd
w.o.j.). Applying this definition, the court held that an office manager was not a common
calling. Id. On appeal, an undaunted Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Travel Masters
covenant not to compete was nevertheless unenforceable because the parties had not exe-
cuted it ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star
Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830,833 (Tex. 1991)(holding "at-will" employment is not an "other-
wise enforceable agreement").
99. See Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987) (labeling hair styl-
ing as a common calling); Martin v. Credit Protection Assoc., Inc., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626
(July 13, 1988) (opinion withdrawn) (holding cable salesman was a common calling);
Bertotti v. C.E. Shepherd Co., Inc., 752 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
no writ) (holding sales manager of a company that manufactured and sold wire and plastic
products was not a common calling); B. Cantrell Oil Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc., 756
S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (holding that manager of propane
supplier was not a common calling).
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In 1989, the Legislature responded to court's new common calling test
and corresponding trend towards striking down covenants not to compete
by passing the Covenant Not to Compete Act (the Act). 1°° This Act ad-
ded sections 15.50 and 15.51 to the Texas Business and Commerce
Code.' 0 ' By passing this Act, which made no mention of common call-
ings, the Legislature sought to return the law to its pre-Hill status.'0 2 On
the heels of the Act's passage, however, the Supreme Court of Texas in-
tentionally snubbed the Legislature by issuing three cotenants-not-to-
compete decisions in apparent disregard for the new Act. 10 3
In DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., the first of these three decisions, the
court initially ignored the new Act, turning instead to the common law to
100. The new subchapter E added by this Act provides:
§ 15.50 Criteria for Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete.
Notwithstanding Section 15.05 of this code, a covenant not to compete is
enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement
at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as
to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are
reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect
the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.
§ 15.51 Procedures and Remedies in Actions to Enforce Covenants Not to
Compete.
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (c) of this section, a court may award
the promisee under a covenant not to compete damages, injunctive relief, or
both damages and injunctive relief for a breach by the promisor of the
covenant.
(b) If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is an-
cillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the promisee
has the burden of establishing that the covenant meets the criteria specified
by Subdivision (2) of Section 15.50 of this code. If the agreement has a dif-
ferent primary purpose, the promisor has the burden of establishing that the
covenant does not meet those criteria. For the purposes of this subsection,
the "burden of establishing" a fact means the burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
(c) If the covenant meets the criteria specified by Subdivision (1) of Sec-
tion 15.50 of this code but does not meet the criteria specified by Subdivision
(2) of Section 15.50, the court, at the request of the promisee, shall reform
the covenant to the extent necessary to cause the covenant to meet the crite-
ria specified by Subdivision (2) of Section 15.50 and enforce the covenant as
reformed, except that the court may not award the promisee damages for a
breach of the covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the
promisee shall be limited to injunctive relief. If the primary purpose of the
agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to
render personal services, the promisor establishes that the promisee knew at
the time of the execution of the agreement that the covenant did not meet
the criteria specified by Subdivision (2) of Section 15.50 and the promisee
sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent than was necessary to
protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court may
award the promisor the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, actually
and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the action to enforce
the covenant.
Id.
101. See Bux, supra note 97, at 9; Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex.
1994).
102. Bux, supra note 97 at 9.
103. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990); Martin v. Credit
Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch
Assoc. Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1990).
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determine the covenant's enforceability. "The fundamental common law
principles which govern the enforceability of covenants not to compete in
Texas are relatively well established.'' 104 Unless an agreement not to
compete is reasonable, it is a restraint of trade and unenforceable on the
grounds of public policy. 10 5 Having restated these common law principals
governing covenants not to compete, the DeSantis court enumerated a
three-prong test for evaluating "reasonableness," which oddly enough
bore a striking resemblance to the new Act: (1) the covenant must be
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship; (2) the cove-
nant must not be more of a restraint than necessary to protect the prom-
isee's interest; and (3) the promisee's need for protection must be greater
than any hardship to the promisor or injury to the public. 106 In conjunc-
tion with its issuance of a new test for reasonable, the court discussed the
confusion created by its Hill decision and the presumed common calling
requirement. While the court flatly rejected a common calling test,10 7 it
reserved the right to consider common calling as a factor when making its
overall determination of reasonableness.10 8
Applying its new reasonableness test, the court determined that De-
Santis's agreement not to compete was not necessary to protect any legiti-
mate business interest.109 Accordingly, the court held that the agreement
was unreasonable and therefore unenforceable." 0 Only after reaching
this conclusion did the court finally address the passage of subchapter E
to the Texas Business and Commerce Code. After a cursory mention, the
court "conclud[ed] that the result in this case would not be affected by the
statute.""'
104. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681.
105. Id.
106. 1. at 681-82.
107. Id. at 682-83.
108. Id. at 683. The supreme court also noted that the Legislature rejected the "com-
mon calling" as a test for the reasonableness of a covenant not to compete when it passed
its new law. Id.
109. Desantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684. DeSantis devoted his entire career to providing se-
curity services. Wackenhut, a corporation which provided security guards to other compa-
nies, hired DeSantis to run its Houston division. After three years, DeSantis resigned
under threat of termination. Following his resignation, he started a company which mar-
keted security services to a limited clientele - about half of which were previously Wack-
enhut's clients. DeSantis's employment agreement with Wackenhut contained a covenant
not to compete. Based on this covenant, Wackenhut sued DeSantis claiming that the good-
will DeSantis developed for Wackenhut during his employment with them was a business
interest worthy of protection under its covenant not to compete. The court found little
evidence in the record to support this allegation. Id. at 683. Wackenhut also claimed that
it possessed confidential information that required the protection afforded by a covenant
not to compete such as customer lists, the special fees and requirements of their customers,
Wackenhut's pricing policies, cost factors, and bidding strategies. The court held that
Wackenhut failed to show that this information was not just as easily accessible through
other sources. Id. at 684. As a result,. Wackenhut failed to meet the second prong of the
court's reasonableness test, showing that they had a legitimate business interest necessitat-
ing the use of covenant not to compete. Id.
110. Id
111. Id. at 685.
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In Juliette Fowler Holmes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc.112 the court
applied the DeSantis reasonableness test. Focusing on the second prong
regarding the necessity of such a covenant to protect the promisee's legit-
imate business interest, the court inquired as to whether or not the cove-
nant not to compete contained reasonable limitations concerning time,
geographical area and scope of activity.113 Because the covenant con-
tained no limitations concerning applicable geographic territories or
scope of activity, the court declared this restraint to be "absolute, une-
quivocal and unreasonable." 114 In a subsequent footnote, the court
briefly addressed the new Act by again stating that it would not require a
different result from the one reached."15
In its third case, Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n,116 the supreme court
elaborated on the first prong of the DeSantis reasonableness test. The
issue before the court was whether or not the parties executed the cove-
nant not to compete ancillary to another "otherwise enforceable agree-
ment. 1" 7  Either party could have terminated the employment
relationship at anytime; therefore, their "employment-at-will" relation-
ship by itself was not an enforceable agreement because any promise of
continued employment was illusory."18 In addition, the court held that
the promise of continued employment did not constitute the independent
valuable consideration required to support a covenant not to compete
that was executed after the employee had started working.119 Because
the parties entered the agreement three years after Martin started to
work for the company and the agreement contained nothing more than
the covenant not to compete, the court held that the covenant not to
compete was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement.' 20 As
a result, the covenant not to compete was unenforceable.' 21
As far as the Martin holding related to employment-at-will relation-
ships and their inability to support covenants not to compete, it sparked
new tensions between the Texas Judiciary and the Texas Legislature in
the area of noncompetition agreements. Because "at-will" employment
is typical in Texas, a common law ruling which exempted such relation-
ships from the realm of enforceable covenant not to compete agreement
112. 793 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1990).
113. Id. at 662-63.
114. Id. at 663.
115. Id. at 663 n.6. Apparently, the court's displeasure with the new law stemmed from
the Legislature's attempt to have the law applied retroactively. Id. at 664. See also DeSan-
t/s, 739 S.W.2d at 684-85.
116. 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
117. Id. at 669.
118. Id. at 670. See also infra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing black letter
law reason why employment-at-will cannot be enforceable because it is based on illusory
promises).
119. Id. The DeSantis court held that a covenant not to compete, executed on a date
other than the date on which the underlying agreement is executed, is enforceable only if it
is supported by independent valuable consideration. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681.




was bound to cause a stir. In fact, the Martin ruling, in large part,
prompted the Legislature to amend the Covenants Not to Compete
Act.122 In an attempt to replace the common law of covenants not to
compete in its entirety, the Legislature passed amendments to the Act in
1993.123
On September 1, 1993, these amendments went into effect making
them ripe for judicial action during this Survey period. In a bold opinion,
the Texas Supreme Court addressed the new amendments and ignored
the Legislature's attempt to obliterate the existing common law on cove-
nants not to compete. In Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas,124 the
court taunted the Legislature by reiterating its prior holding that an at-
will employment relationship by itself cannot constitute an otherwise en-
forceable agreement. 125 Focusing on black-letter contract law, the court
noted that at-will employment relationships are not enforceable
agreements. 126
In the at-will employment context, neither party has an obligation to
continue the employment relationship. Any promise which seeks to form
the basis of an enforceable agreement cannot be conditioned or tied in
any way to the duration of employment because such a promise would be
illusory. 127 In order to have an enforceable covenant not to compete in
the at-will context, the court concluded that the covenant must be ancil-
122. Acts of May 13, 1993, ch. 965, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen Laws 4201 (effective Sept. 1,
1993). The Legislature amended § 15.50 to remove the requirement that the covenant not
to compete be supported by "independent valuable consideration" if it is entered at a time
other than the underlying agreement. In an even more poignant act, they amended § 15.51
to include the following new language: "(b) If the primary purpose of the agreement to
which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, for a
term or at will..." TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (em-
phasis added). Through the inclusion of the words "at-will," the Legislature made an obvi-
ous attempt to strike the Martin court's ruling concerning "employment-at-will" and
covenants not to compete.
123. The addition of § 15.52 made it painfully clear that the Legislature intended the
Covenants Not to Compete Act to largely supplant the Texas common law relating to en-
forcement of covenants not to compete. Section 15.52 provides:
§ 15.52 Preemption of Other Law
The criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to compete provided by
Section 15.50 of this code and the procedures and remedies in an action to
enforce a covenant not to compete provided by Section 15.51 of this code are
exclusive and preempt any other criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to
compete or procedures and remedies in an action to enforce a covenant not
to compete under common law or otherwise.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.52 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
124. 883 S.W.2d 642 (1994).
125. Id. at 644 (citing Travel Masters, 827 S.W.2d at 832-33).
126. Id. The supreme court held:
We reach this conclusion on the basis of black-letter contract law, and not
because the Legislature added the words "at-will" to § 15.51, .. . As written,
part (b) [of § 15.51] has no meaning, because there cannot be an "[otherwise
enforceable] agreement" which "obligate[s] a promisor 'at-will.' Describing
something as an at-will obligation is nonsensical."
Id. at 644 n.7.
127. Id. at 644 n.5.
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lary to an agreement supported by other or additional promises that are
not illusory.128
The Light court proceeded to evaluate whether or not the parties had
an otherwise enforceable agreement based on promises other than their
at-will employment relationship. According to the court, three promises
existed that could serve as consideration for an agreement. After a brief
analysis, the court determined that an otherwise enforceable agreement
for the employer to train Light in exchange for Light's giving two weeks
notice to terminate employment and providing the employer with an in-
ventory upon her termination existed. 129 Having determined that an
agreement existed, the court turned to the second required inquiry: Was
the covenant not to compete ancillary to or part of this otherwise en-
forceable agreement?
The Legislature failed to provide any standards for assessing this sec-
ond inquiry, compelling the Texas Supreme Court to develop one.
Adopting United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens's standard, as
outlined in Justice Stevens's dissent to Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp.,130 the court held that a covenant not to compete
was not ancillary to the otherwise enforceable agreement unless it was
designed to enforce a contractual obligation of one of the parties. 131 This
designed-to-enforce-a-contractual-obligation standard has two
requirements:
(1) the consideration given by the employer in the otherwise en-
forceable agreement must give rise to the employer's interest in re-
straining the employee from competing; and
(2) the covenant must be designed to enforce the employee's con-
sideration or return promise in the otherwise enforceable
agreement.132
Applying the above standard to the Light agreement, the court held that
the covenant not to compete was not ancillary to or a part of their other-
wise enforceable agreement because it was not designed to enforce either
of Light's return promises - to give two weeks' notice or to provide an
inventory upon termination. 33 Once again, the court stuck down a cove-
nant not to compete as "a naked restraint on trade and
unenforceable.' 134
Following suit, in Burgess v. Permian Court Reporters, Inc.,135 the El
Paso Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, dissolving the temporary
injunction it issued to enforce a covenant not the compete. 136 Stanley
Burgess (Burgess) worked for Permian Court Reporters (Permian). Con-
128. Id. at 645.
129. a d at 645-46.
130. 485 U.S. 717, 739-41 & n.3, 744-46 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647.
132. Id
133. Id. at 647-48.
134. Id at 647.
135. 864 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
136. Id. at 728.
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tained in his employment contract, the contested covenant not to com-
pete recited that upon termination of his employment Burgess would not
work within a fifty mile radius of Midland and Odessa for two years un-
less he was appointed as an official court reporter for a court of record.
Permian obtained a temporary. injunction from the trial court based on
this covenant.
On appeal, Burgess argued that the contract between Permian and
himself was not an otherwise enforceable agreement because it merely
created an at-will employment relationship. 137 Relying on Zep Manufac-
turing Co. v. Harthcock, 38 Permian argued that at-will relationships can
support covenants not to compete. Because the Zep agreement con-
tained a clause limiting the reason why Harthcock could be fired to unsat-
isfactory performance as determined by Zep's president, the court
distinguished the cases by holding that Zep did not involve a true at-will
relationship.' 39 Citing Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc.,140 the court
of appeals agreed with Burgess and held that at-will relationships do not
support the enforcement of covenants not to compete.' 4 '
In a supplemental motion for rehearing, Permian requested the court
to reconsider its decision in light of the recent amendments to the Texas
Business and Commercial Code.142 After determining that the new legis-
lative amendments did apply to the case, the court of appeals focused on
the recently decided Texas Supreme Court case of Light v. Centel Cellular
Co. of Texas.143 "Following the Supreme Court's lead, we again note that
the contract between Burgess and Permian was terminable at will...
[and] therefore not an otherwise enforceable agreement" and cannot
meet the criteria necessary to sustain a covenant to compete. 44 Deciding
between the legislative amendments and the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion, the El Paso Court of Appeals made its choice clear.
In General Devices, Inc. v. Bacon145 the case was on remand to the
Dallas Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the Texas
Supreme Court's Travel Masters decision. General Devices, Inc. (GDI)
was an employment placement agency furnishing highly skilled tempo-
rary personnel to high-tech companies. GDI executed employment
agreements containing covenants not to compete with all of its employ-
ees. In 1987, Bacon and Shannon (the defendants) left GDI's employ-
ment and began to work directly for a company which had previously
been their temporary employer. The evidence also indicated that the de-
137. Id. at 727.
138, 824 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
139. Burgess, 864 S.W.2d at 728.
140. 827 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. 1991). See supra note 126 & accompanying text (citing
the "at-will" holding in Travel Masters).
141, Burgess, 864 S.W.2d at 728.
142. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing legislative amendments
to §§ 15.50-.52 in 1993).
143. 888 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
144. Burgess, 864 S.W.2d at 729.
145. 888 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
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fendants encouraged twelve other GDI employees on that assignment to
do the same thing. As a result, GDI sued the defendants alleging breach
of their covenants not to compete, tortious interference with GDI's con-
tractual relationships with its twelve other employees, and tortious inter-
ference with its contractual relationship with its client - the temporary
employer. 146
In the trial court, GDI moved for summary judgment because its cove-
nants not to compete were enforceable and because the defendants had
no viable claims under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The
defendants responded and moved for partial summary judgment because
their covenants not to compete were unenforceable and because they had
viable claims under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The
trial court granted GDI's motion for summary judgment and denied the
defendants' motion.147 The case proceeded to trial. At the close of
GDI's case-in-chief, however, the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendants, ruling that GDI presented insufficient evidence on
damages.' 48
Even though the court of appeals was taking its second look, it still
struggled in applying the new covenant not to compete laws. While the
Texas Supreme Court remanded the case with explicit directions to re-
consider it in light of its Travel Masters decision, the court of appeals
failed to follow the Travel Masters analysis in reviewing the covenant not
to compete issue. Although the court correctly noted the governing com-
mon law and statutory provisions, the court skipped the first inquiry
under the DeSantis reasonableness test - whether or not the covenant
not to compete is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement. 149 In
Travel Masters, however, this was the central issue culminating in the
holding that at-will employment cannot support a covenant not to com-
pete because it is not an otherwise enforceable agreement. 50 Having
failed the first step of the reasonableness inquiry, the court held that the
Travel Masters covenant not to compete was unenforceable.' 5'
The General Devices court, ignoring the Travel Masters holding,
jumped right into the second inquiry of the reasonableness test: is the
covenant not to compete more of a restraint than necessary to protect the
employer's interest? In evaluating this issue, the court asked whether or
not the covenant not to compete was appropriately limited as to time,
geographic area, and scope of activity. Because GDI's covenant sought
to limit employment between the employee and its clients for thirty days
after the end of GDI's relationship with the client and did not specify a
geographic boundary, the court held that the covenant not to compete
146. Id. at 500.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 503.




was not sufficiently limited as to be reasonable. 152 Accordingly, the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment for GDI on this
point. 153
Finally, in the last of the Survey period's covenant not to compete
cases, the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal
from a temporary injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete.' 54 On
April 12, 1993, the trial court granted a temporary injunction and set a
trial on the merits for July 19, 1993.155 The defendants perfected an inter-
locutory appeal. 156 Five days before the case was set to go to trial on the
merits, the defendants filed a Plea in Abatement, or, in the alternative,
First Motion for Continuance urging the court to postpone the trial be-
cause a pivotal question of law was before the court of appeals. Great
North American Companies (GNAC), the plaintiff, did not oppose the
motion. The trial court abated the case on July 16, 1993.157 Neither party
attempted to get the trial reset before the appeal was heard.
Annoyed that the parties basically agreed to delay the trial on the mer-
its while pursuing a frivolous appeal that could not evaluate the merits,
the court dismissed the appeal. 158 While the court was tempted to award
damages for delay against the parties, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
84 only allows a court to award damages for delay to the prevailing
party.' 59 Because GNAC had not opposed the motion, the court declined
to reward its acquiescence, and therefore, ordered each of the parties to
pay their own costs of appeal.' 60
V. TORTS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
A. TRADE SECRETS
In addition to causes of action based on breach of contract arising from
a covenant not to compete agreement, employers may pursue the tort of
unfair competition to protect their trade secrets against appropriation by
former employees and disclosure to competitors. 161 In Texas, a cause of
action for misappropriation of trade secrets has four elements: (1) the
existence of a trade secret; (2) the obtaining of the secret from its owner
152. General Devices, 888 S.W.2d at 504. Theoretically, the relationship between GDI
and its clients could last indefinitely. As a result, any restraint on the employee tied to
such a time frame is wholly unreasonable. Id.
153. Id.
154. Hiss v. Great North Am. Cos., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no
writ).
155. Id. at 219.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 220. Because an interlocutory appeal may not be used to get an advanced
ruling on the merits, "[t]he fastest way to cure the hardship of an unfavorable preliminary
order is to try the case on the merits." Id. at 219 (citations ommitted). As a result, "[t]he
appeal of a temporary injunction should not be cause for trial delay." Id. (citing TEX. R.
Civ. P. 683).
159. Id. at 220 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 84).
160. Id.
161. See Bux, supra note 97, at 18.
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in confidence or by improper means; (3) the unauthorized use of the
trade secret by the person who obtained it; and (4) damage caused to the
owner of the trade secret by its use.162 During the Survey period, one
Texas court addressed the first element asking what is a trade secret.
In Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Serv-Tech, Inc.163 the Houston
Court of Appeals reviewed a case alleging breach of contract and misap-
propriation of confidential, trade secret, and/or technical information.
Because Texas only recognizes a cause of action for misappropriated
trade secrets, the appellants challenged the jury's award for such a viola-
tion claiming that the appellees failed to show that a trade secret existed.
The court's determinative inquiry focused on whether or not the appro-
priated information was secret or at least substantially secret, entitling it
to protection as a trade secret.164
In order for information to qualify as a trade secret, the law is well
settled that the information must be kept secret. 165 Instead of addressing
the issue in terms of a trade secret, the Serv-Tech trial court referred to
the appropriated information as "confidential information." Regardless
of what the information is called, Texas recognizes a viable cause of ac-
tion for misappropriation of the information when it is kept secret or sub-
stantially secret.166 After reviewing the questions submitted to the jury
and the trial court's definition of confidential information, 167 the court of
appeals noted that neither of them recognized or required secrecy as an
element of the cause of action. Because the information must be secret to
162. K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.
1958), cert. denied sub. nom, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) .
163. 879 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
164. Id. at 99.
165. Id. at 98 (citing Wissman v. Boucher, 240 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1951)). "A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do hot know or use it." Id. at 95 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 757, cmt. b).
166. Id. at 95-99.
167. The trial judge instructed the jury:
"Confidential Information" - Although given information is not a trade
secret, one who receives the information in a confidential relation or discov-
ers it by improper means may be under some duty not to disclose or use that
information. Because of the confidential relation or the impropriety of the
means of discovery, he may be compelled to go to other sources for the infor-
mation. The duty not to use or disclose "confidential information" may be
imposed by employment or contract where one person trusts and relies upon
the other. Such information may be a trade secret or similar specific infor-
mation received under moral or business circumstances that would reason-
ably require confidentiality. This is determined by the actual facts of the
relationship.
Id. at 95-96.
According to this definition, secrecy need not exist in order for a misappropriation of
information to rise to the level of an actionable misappropriation. Id. at 96. This is, how-
ever, an incorrect statement of the law. Because Texas does not recognize an action for
misappropriation of confidential information but does recognize an action for misappropri-
ation of trade secrets, the first element of which is proving the existence of a trade secret,
the plaintiff must show that the information was kept secret in order to establish a viable
claim under trade secrets law. Id. at 99.
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be entitled to protection under trade secrets law, the court concluded that
the jury's findings failed to establish a cause of action for misappropriated
information. 168
In Garth v. Staktek Corp.,169 another trade secret case, the court deter-
mined whether or not injunctive relief was a proper remedy if the trade
secret had since been publicly released. In January of 1990, Garth, Bums,
and Campbell formed BCG Ventures to produce a three-dimensional
high-density memory package for mini-and-micro computer application.
During the first month, Burns and Garth signed a nondisclosure agree-
ment covering information exchanged during the venture, excusing infor-
mation that otherwise became publicly available. Shortly thereafter, the
venture dissolved even though Bums had made some important advances
in his research.
Upon dissolution, all three venturers signed an agreement giving Bums
all rights to the intellectual property that he created while participating in
the venture. Bums and Campbell formed Staktek Corporation to pro-
duce Bum's product. Garth joined another firm, RTB Technology, which
then attempted to license and market a competing product. In 1992 a
trade publication published Bum's patent abstract. In 1993 an article
came out which highlighted RTB's competing product. After the publica-
tion of this 1993 article, Staktek sought to enjoin RTB and Garth from
using its trade secrets. 170
Because Bum's patent abstract was published to the public in 1992,
RTB and Garth argued that Staktek's trade secrets were no longer secret,
and therefore, open to use. 171 From the evidence, however, the trial
court determined, and the court of appeals agreed, that RTB and Garth
used Bum's technology prior to its publication in 1992.172 "By appropri-
ating Staktek's confidential information before its publication, RTB was
able to prepare to enter the market at the same time as Staktek, and thus
could deprive Staktek of the competitive advantage offered by the nor-
mal developmental period.' 73 As a result, the court determined that
real relief from misappropriation of trade secrets used to concurrently
develop a similar product would appropriately entail injunctive relief be-
yond the date that the developing company would publicize its new
technology. 174
168. Stewart & Stevenson, 879 S.W.2d at 99.
169. 876 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
170. Id. at 547.
171. Id. at 548.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 549. Unlike the situation in Serv-Tech, the element of secrecy was evidenced






The difference between an action for misappropriation and an action
for trade secrets violations lies in the item stolen. While trade secret laws
protect intellectual property, the doctrine of "misappropriation" protects
tangible property from unauthorized use. The elements of misappropria-
tion are:
(1) the creation of plaintiff's product through extensive time, labor,
skill and money; (2) the defendant's use of that product in competi-
tion with plaintiff, thereby gaining a special advantage in that compe-
tition (i.e., a "free ride") because defendant is burdened with little or
none of the expense incurred by the plaintiff; and (3) commercial
damage to plaintiff.175
During the Survey period, the Waco Court of Appeals heard a case con-
cerning an issue of misappropriation.
In United States Sporting Products, Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls,
Inc.176 Stewart had expended a significant amount of time and money to
capture the sounds of wild animals on tape, which he later marketed. At
trial, the jury agreed with Stewart and found that U.S. Sporting Products
and its president (the appellants) misappropriated various animal sound
recordings that Stewart had gathered. 177 The appellants argued that
Texas did not recognize a claim for misappropriation. 178 After surveying
the law, the court held that Texas does recognize misappropriation as an
actionable claim.179 The court also ruled that money damages could be
recovered for a successful misappropriation claim. 180 "If only injunctive
relief were available for a misappropriation claim, tortious conduct would
take the posture of an ordinary business decision allowing the defendant
to keep his ill-gotten gain.'' According to the Waco Court of Appeals,
both monetary and injunctive remedies are available for
misappropriation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having summarized the developments during the Survey period, this
Article provided a broad overview of pertinent issues in business torts.
The Article also provided an analysis of relevant cases which were de-
cided during the Survey period. Hopefully, this discussion will aid the
reader in understanding the progression of Texas business torts law.
175. United States Sporting Prod., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d
214, 218 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (citing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Uni-
versity Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Tex. 1979)).
176. 865 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
177. Id. at 216.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 218.
180. Id. at 219 (citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236(1918)).
181. Id.
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